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WASHINGTON, D.C. (July 1, 2008) - A new book released by the
Army examines the challenging period of transition from
conventional combined-arms operations to full-spectrum and
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq after the fall of Saddam
Hussein's regime in April 2003.
On Point II was written to provide a historical account for
future Army leaders on the decisive 18 months following the
overthrow of Saddam's regime, Army Col. Timothy Reese, an armor
officer and one of the book's authors, told online journalists and
bloggers in a teleconference yesterday.
"We tried to capture the improvisation and ingenuity of the
average American soldier as they ... work through the challenges of
detainee operations and working without enough linguists and trying
to figure out how to oversee or supervise reconstruction
operations," On Point II co-author Donald Wright added.
Reese explained that a period of uncertainty followed the
regime's collapse, when the message wasn't clear on how U.S. and
coalition forces would handle the turnover of power in Iraq.
"Was it an immediate turnover of power to ... some sort of Iraqi
governing body, or was it going to be a multiyear process of allied
occupation leading to a constitution and elections?" he asked.
"That [message] was certainly missing, and it was a message that
changed radically in the course of 30 days, so that hurt," Reese
said.
"You can imagine that, in that chaos, where assumptions are
changing every day, it would have been very difficult for the
military to sort of form this overall command message to the
population about exactly where the coalition hoped to take Iraq and
its citizens," Wright said.
As a result, Reese said, U.S. Army and coalition forces
throughout Iraq had to initiate programs without the presence of
psychological operations and civil affairs assets and without
guidance from centralized leadership.
"So, in places around the country, units kind of take up the
slack and develop their own messages and programs," Reese said,
"and they filter up towards the higher headquarters, rather than
from the higher headquarters down."
Wright said that these challenges at the tactical level in the
first 18 months after the collapse of the Saddam's regime are the
focus of most chapters in On Point II.
"Most of the chapters of the book are really at the tactical
level," Wright said. "How are the soldiers trying to deal with the
guidance that they get from above, as well as the challenges they
face in the [areas of responsibility]?
"And they're all very different," he continued. "The 1st Armored
Division is facing a much different situation in Baghdad than is
the 101st [Airborne Division] up in the Mosul area."
Reese cited some examples of locally developed initiatives --
"everything from simple stuff like rules of the road when driving
and how to pick up trash in your neighborhood, to how we're going
to form a local advisory council in your town or your province to
help establish some self-government."
"We try to describe that transition and show the incredible ...
ingenuity and initiative of units around the spectrum," Reese
added.
Regarding the apparent lack of central leadership during the
period the book covers, Reese said he hopes readers won't walk away
thinking senior leaders in the U.S. government and armed forces
were unprepared.
"The magnitude of the tasks in [front of] them were so immense
and the time so short that it ... would have been very, very
difficult, no matter how good that planning was and how good the
team structure was in these organizations," he said.
"Even if that planning had been a bit more robust and had ...
happened earlier on in the process," Reese added, "a lot of the
assumptions on which that planning was done turned out to be
incorrect once the coalition got to Baghdad."
Reese explained that On Point II is part of a series of books on
military history being published by the Combat Studies Institute at
Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
"This book should be seen in the context of the Army as a
learning organization, ... where the Army tries to learn as best it
can from its operations -- good, bad or otherwise," he said.
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