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WASHINGTON, D.C. (September 9, 2008) - At the end of 2006, Iraq
seemed on the verge of a civil war.
Al-Qaida was inciting divisions between Sunni and Shiia Iraqis.
The newly elected government seemed ineffectual. Militia groups
roamed neighborhoods and intimidated those who did not agree with
them.
More than 100 U.S. servicemembers per month were being killed in
fighting in the country. Today, that number has dropped
dramatically, thanks largely to the troop surge and a new strategy
that senior military officials credit with laying the groundwork
for success throughout Iraq.
U.S. officials understood the challenges in Iraq and studied
ways to stabilize and improve the situation. Even after his party
lost the November 2006 congressional elections, President Bush said
there would be "no retreat" from American goals for Iraq.
Civilian and military officials debated, posited, proposed,
tested and eventually adopted a new way forward for the effort in
Iraq that came to be known as "the surge." Bush announced the surge
on Jan. 10, 2007. The bare bones of the plan committed more than
20,000 Army and Marine combat troops to the fight. The plan was to
concentrate the troops in Baghdad and Anbar province - the two most
restive areas in Iraq at the time. Baghdad, with a population of
around 7.5 million people, is the center of gravity for the
country. Progress there, it was thought, would influence the level
of violence around the country.
Bush said the surge, plus a new strategy, would give the Iraqi
government the time to develop and grow. "If we increase our
support at this crucial moment and help the Iraqis break the
current cycle of violence, we can hasten the day our troops begin
coming home," he said in a speech to the nation.
"I am of conviction that this military plan - properly part of
the new political emphasis and new economic plus-up - can provide
the success we are looking for," Marine Gen. Peter Pace, then the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Armed
Services Committee the day after Bush announcd the plan. Defense
Secretary Robert M. Gates - in office for less than a month at the
time - agreed with the assessment.
"Your senior military officers in Iraq and in Washington believe
in the efficacy of the strategy outlined by the president last
night," Gates said to the House committee. "Our senior military
officers have worked closely with the Iraqis to develop this plan.
The impetus to add U.S. forces came initially from our commanders
there."
In October 2006, 106 Americans were killed due to all causes in
Iraq. In December 2006, the number rose to 112. In July 2008, the
number of Americans killed was 13. Last month, 23 were killed.
The surge was just one reason for success in Iraq, said Brig
Gen. John F. Campbell, the deputy director for regional operations
at the J-3 on the Joint Staff. The surge was important, but so were
the increased capabilities of Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi
Awakening, though "you could argue the other two couldn't happen
without the first," he said.
Campbell was the assistant division commander for the 1st
Cavalry Division, which formed the core of Multinational Division
Baghdad. He was in Baghdad from the start of the surge and left
earlier this year.
The first of the surge brigades arrived in Baghdad from Kuwait
in January 2007 - the 82nd Airborne Division's 2nd Brigade Combat
Team. The soldiers went almost immediately into combat operations.
Between then and June, four more brigades, a Marine expeditionary
unit and two Marine battalions deployed to Iraq. Thousands of
"enablers" - combat service and combat service support
servicemembers - also deployed.
At the same time, the Iraqis were engaged in their own surge,
which often is overlooked, Campbell said. The Iraqi surge was
equally crucial to the turnaround in the country, the general
noted, and the Iraqi military committed to sending nine battalions
into Baghdad. This was a precarious commitment.
"In October [2006], the Iraqis had sent two battalions to
Baghdad, and the experience was not good," Campbell said. Many
Iraqi soldiers deserted upon hearing of the deployment; others ran
at the first sign of trouble.
The coalition force focused on training the Iraqi forces prior
to the surge. "They became more confident, better able to withstand
pressure," Campbell said. "They could stand up in a fight. When
these forces came into Baghdad as part of the Iraqi surge, they
were much better trained, they had good [coalition] transition
folks with them and were more confident."
The Iraqis planned to deploy the battalions to Baghdad for
90-day tours. In contrast, the coalition forces would be on the
ground for 15 months.
"You need time on the ground, you need to develop relationships,
you need to get to know the people," Campbell said. "They realized
they needed more time to understand the ground, develop the
relationships, meet the sheiks, meet the people, understand the
leaders."
Ultimately, the Iraqi units stayed in place for six months, with
others in place for a year.
The experience on the ground, working with U.S. forces, helped
the Iraqi forces increase their capabilities. "Just being next to a
U.S. soldier, they got better," Campbell said. "They wanted to look
like our guys. They wanted to carry the same weapons. They wanted
all the kit like we had. [They benefitted from] seeing how our guys
handled themselves around people, around kids and the like."
More troops are important, but what really made the surge
effective was the counterinsurgency strategy, Campbell said. The
mission of counterinsurgency operations is to protect the
population from attack and separate the vast majority of people
from extremists.
"You have to get out and live with the people 24/7," Campbell
said. "We weren't living on a big [forward operating base], going
out and patrolling and then coming back to live."
The coalition units set up combat outposts and joint security
stations in the neighborhoods of Baghdad - often in the places with
the most attacks. The strategy in Iraq in 2006 was to "clear, hold,
build" - clear the neighborhoods, hold them and then build in the
neighborhoods so the people would see the benefits of peace.
But there were issues with the strategy, Campbell said.
"We could clear, no problem. We're the best at it in the world,"
he explained. "The problem was we didn't have the numbers to hold
and protect the citizens of a city of 7.5 million people. We just
didn't have the numbers of either coalition or Iraqis to do
so."
The surge provided the numbers, and coalition and Iraqi forces
went out into the neighborhoods. "When you are able to saturate
them and stay there 24/7, and you live with the people, and they
know you're going to be there every day, it makes a difference,"
the general said.
Baghdadis grew accustomed to having coalition and Iraqi troops
around. They saw them day after day, and they started believing
that the coalition and Iraqi soldiers would provide protection from
al-Qaida terrorists or militias.
"Every day we stayed there living with them meant more people
understood we were there for the long haul," Campbell said. "That
brought the people around."
Iraqi citizens began phoning in tips or telling soldiers where
the roadside bombs were or where the enemy weapons caches were
hidden. They began turning in those people who murdered and
intimidated them in the name of al-Qaida.
And the government and coalition units began pumping money and
jobs into the regions.
Command and control of the Iraqi forces also helped improve the
results of the surge. The Iraqis established the Baghdad Operations
Center under the command of Army Lt. Gen. Abud Qabar.
"All the Iraqi army, all the national police and all the local
police [operated] under his control," Campbell said. Before, Iraqi
army units reported to the Iraqi Defense Ministry, and police units
reported to the Interior Ministry.
"With the BOC, there was one chain of command and unity of
effort," Campbell said.
The Iraqis increasingly planned and executed their own
operations. Police and army personnel began working closely
together, and this enabled the coalition to take troops from some
more peaceful areas and place them in other areas where they could
help improve security. This extended the reach of the surge,
Campbell said.
The "Awakening," in which Iraqi sheiks began taking an active
role in providing security, began in Anbar province, and quickly
moved to Baghdad and its environs.
"There was rough going initially in Abu Ghraib and inside
Ameriyah," Campbell said. Both areas are primarily Sunni, and
al-Qaida wanted to keep them. The terror group had intimidated the
citizens. The extremists tortured and killed hundreds of Iraqis in
their campaign to control the neighborhoods. But the people in
those areas were tired of violence, and they began following tribal
elders and sheiks in cooperating with coalition and government
forces.
It took time for the improvements in security to happen,
Campbell said.
"We didn't have the final brigade combat team until June," he
said. "And even then, there was heavy fighting. When you go into
areas you've never been before, you expect higher casualties. And
we got them."
In June 2007, the coalition faced tough casualties, but by
August the attacks were beginning to subside. Even the Muslim
observance of Ramadan - the month that ordinarily signals an
increase in attacks - saw a drop.
"The surge allowed us to get control of areas, maintain control
using Iraqi troops and police, and pump money and jobs into the
economy," the general said. "It helped us link up with the sheiks
and tribal leaders and push the Awakening process along."
In many parts of Baghdad today, markets are operating, doctors
are practicing, children are learning and fathers are working. That
would have been inconceivable in 2006, Campbell said.
"I saw the surge in the beginning, and when I left in December
2007 I had seen it turn Baghdad around," he said. "The surge was
very successful and I could see the results. I would have told you
maybe halfway into my tour that I would not have felt good about
leaving. But later, I saw all the benefits. I thought we really
gave the Iraqi people a fighting chance."
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