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MUNICH, Germany (February 8, 2009) - Well, good
morning to you all. And thanks to Chairman Ischinger and his team.
It's an honor to be with you - and it's great to be on the stage
with my new diplomatic partner, AMB Richard Holbrooke. You know,
it's every Commander's dream to have an ambassadorial wingman who
is described by journalists with nicknames like "The Bulldozer." In
all seriousness, I want to publicly salute this gifted, selfless
diplomat for taking on his new position, an appointment that
conveys how significant the focus in the United States is on
Afghanistan and Pakistan and on the South and Central Asia region
more broadly.
This morning's topic is Afghanistan, which Secretary of Defense
Gates recently described to the US Congress as posing "our greatest
military challenge right now." As he noted, our fundamental
objective in Afghanistan is to ensure that transnational terrorists
are not able to reestablish the sanctuaries they enjoyed prior to
9/11. It was to eliminate such sanctuaries that we took action in
Afghanistan in 2001. And preventing their reestablishment remains
an imperative today - noting, to be sure, that achievement of that
objective inevitably requires accomplishment of other interrelated
tasks as well. And, [as has been explained,] President Obama has
directed a strategy review that will sharpen the clarity of those
tasks.
Afghanistan has been a very tough endeavor. Certainly, there
have been important achievements there over the past seven years -
agreement on a constitution, elections, and establishment of a
government; increased access to education, health care, media, and
telecommunications; construction of a significant number of
infrastructure projects; development of the Afghan National Army;
and others.
But in recent years the resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda
has led to an increase in violence, especially in the southern and
eastern parts of the country. Numerous other challenges have
emerged as well, among them: difficulties in the development of
governmental institutions that achieve legitimacy in the eyes of
the Afghan people; corruption; expansion - until last year - of
poppy production and the illegal narcotics industry; and
difficulties in the establishment of the Afghan police.
In fact, there has been nothing easy about Afghanistan. And, as
Senator Lieberman observed in a recent speech to the Brookings
Institution, "Reversing Afghanistan's slide into insecurity will
not come quickly, easily, or cheaply." Similarly, Secretary Gates
told Congress, "This will undoubtedly be a long and difficult
fight." I agree. In fact, I think it is important to be clear eyed
about the challenges that lie ahead, while also remembering the
importance of our objectives in Afghanistan and the importance of
the opportunity that exists if we all intensify our efforts and
work together to achieve those objectives.
Many observers have noted that there are no purely military
solutions in Afghanistan. That is correct. Nonetheless, military
action, while not sufficient by itself, is absolutely necessary,
for security provides the essential foundation for the achievement
of progress in all the other so-called lines of operation -
recognizing, of course, that progress in other areas made possible
by security improvements typically contributes to further progress
in the security arena - creating an upward spiral in which
improvements in one area reinforce progress in another.
Arresting and then reversing the downward spiral in security in
Afghanistan thus will require not just additional military forces,
but also more civilian contributions, greater unity of effort
between civilian and military elements and with our Afghan
partners, and a comprehensive approach, as well as sustained
commitment and a strategy that addresses the situations in
neighboring countries.
This morning, I'd like to describe in very general terms the
resource requirements that are under discussion in Washington and
various other national capitals. Then I'll describe briefly a few
of the ideas that helped us in Iraq and that, properly adapted for
Afghanistan, can help guide GEN McKiernan and ISAF.
THE NEED FOR MORE FORCES, ENABLERS, AND TRAINERS
In recent months, our President and many others have highlighted
the need for additional forces in Afghanistan to reverse the
downward spiral in security, help Afghan forces provide security
for the elections on August 20th, and enable progress in the tasks
essential to achievement of our objectives. Indeed, as has been
announced in recent months, more US forces are entering operations
in as part of ISAF in Afghanistan now, more have been ordered to
deploy, and the deployment of others is under consideration. Beyond
that, the number of Afghan soldiers to be trained and equipped has
been increased, and many of the other troop contributing nations
will deploy additional forces, as well, with a number of
commitments under discussion. And I would be remiss if I did not
ask individual countries to examine what forces and other
contributions they can provide as ISAF intensifies its efforts in
preparation for the elections in August.
It is, of course not just additional combat forces that are
required. ISAF also needs more so-called enablers to support the
effort in Afghanistan - more intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance platforms and the connectivity to exploit the
capabilities they bring; more military police, engineers, and
logistics elements; additional special operations forces and civil
affairs units; more lift and attack helicopters and fixed wing
aircraft; additional air medevac assets; increases in information
operations capabilities; and so on. Also required are more Embedded
Training Teams, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, and Police
Mentoring Teams, all elements that are essential to building
capable Afghan National Security Forces. And I applaud the German
Defense Minister's announcement of additional police and army
training teams this morning. As with combat forces, some additional
enabler elements are already flowing to Afghanistan, commitments
have been made to provide others, and others are under discussion
as well.
As Senator Lieberman highlighted in his Brookings speech, a
surge in civilian capacity is needed to match the increase in
military forces in order to field adequate numbers of provincial
reconstruction teams and other civilian elements - teams and
personnel that are essential to help our Afghan partners expand
their capabilities in key governmental areas, to support basic
economic development, and to assist in the development of various
important aspects of the rule of law, including initiatives to
support the development of police and various judicial
initiatives.
It is also essential, of course, that sufficient financial
resources be provided for the effort in Afghanistan. It is hugely
important that nations deliver on pledges of economic development
assistance, that the Afghan National Army and Law and Order Trust
Funds be fully financed, that support be maintained for the Afghan
Reconstruction Trust Fund, and that resources continue to be
provided for the projects conducted by our military units and PRTs
at local levels. And, I applaud the German Defense Minister's
announcement of additional development aid this morning, too.
Of course, just more troops, civilians, dollars and Euros won't
be enough. As students of history, we're keenly aware that
Afghanistan has, over the years, been known as the graveyard of
empires. It is, after all, a country that has never taken kindly to
outsiders bent on conquering it. We cannot take that history
lightly. And our awareness of it should caution us to recognize
that, while additional forces are essential, their effectiveness
will depend on how they are employed, as that, in turn, will
determine how they are seen by the Afghan population.
COUNTERINSURGENCY FOR AFGHANISTAN
What I'd like to discuss next, then, are some of the concepts
that our commanders have in mind as plans are refined to employ
additional forces. I base this on discussions with GEN McKiernan
and others who have served in Afghanistan, as well as on lessons
learned in recent years. I do so with awareness that a number of
the elements on the ground are operating along the lines of these
ideas - and that their ability to do so will be enhanced by the
increased density on the ground of ISAF and Afghan forces as
additional elements deploy to the most challenging areas.
Counterinsurgency operations are, after all, troop intensive.
Finally, I want to underscore the fact that commanders on the
ground will, as always, operationalize the so-called big ideas in
ways that are appropriate for their specific situations on the
ground. So here are some of those ideas:
First and foremost, our forces and those of our Afghan partners
have to strive to secure and serve the population. We have to
recognize that the Afghan people are the decisive "terrain." And
together with our Afghan partners, we have to work to provide the
people security, to give them respect, to gain their support, and
to facilitate the provision of basic services, the development of
the Afghan Security Forces in the area, the promotion of local
economic development, and the establishment of governance that
includes links to the traditional leaders in society and is viewed
as legitimate in the eyes of the people.
Securing and serving the people requires that our forces be good
neighbors. While it may be less culturally acceptable to live among
the people in certain parts of Afghanistan than it was in Iraq, it
is necessary to locate Afghan and ISAF forces where they can
establish a persistent security presence. You can't commute to work
in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Positioning
outposts and patrol bases, then, requires careful thought,
consultation with local leaders, and the establishment of good
local relationships to be effective.
Positioning near those we and our Afghan partners are helping to
secure also enables us to understand the neighborhood. A nuanced
appreciation of the local situation is essential. Leaders and
troopers have to understand the tribal structures, the power
brokers, the good guys and the bad guys, local cultures and
history, and how systems are supposed to work and do work. This
requires listening and being respectful of local elders and
mullahs, and farmers and shopkeepers - and it also requires, of
course, many cups of tea.
It is also essential that we achieve unity of effort, that we
coordinate and synchronize the actions of all ISAF and Afghan
forces -- and those of our Pakistani partners across the border --
and that we do the same with the actions of our embassy and
international partners, our Afghan counterparts, local governmental
leaders, and international and non-governmental organizations.
Working to a common purpose is essential in the conduct of
counterinsurgency operations.
We also, in support of and in coordination with our Afghan
partners, need to help promote local reconciliation, although this
has to be done very carefully and in accordance with the principles
established in the Afghan Constitution. In concert with and in
support of our Afghan partners, we need to identify and separate
the "irreconcilables" from the "reconcilables, striving to create
the conditions that can make the reconcilables part of the
solution, even as we kill, capture, or drive out the
irreconcilables. In fact, programs already exist in this area and
careful application of them will be essential in the effort to
fracture and break off elements of the insurgency in order to get
various groups to put down their weapons and support the legitimate
constitution of Afghanistan.
Having said that, we must pursue the enemy relentlessly and
tenaciously. True irreconcilables, again, must be killed, captured,
or driven out of the area. And we cannot shrink from that any more
than we can shrink from being willing to support Afghan
reconciliation with those elements that show a willingness to
reject the insurgents and help Afghan and ISAF forces.
To ensure that the gains achieved endure, ISAF and Afghan forces
have to hold areas that have been cleared. Once we fight to clear
and secure an area, we must ensure that it is retained. The people
- and local security forces - need to know that we will not abandon
them. Additionally, we should look for ways to give local citizens
a stake in the success of the local security effort and in the
success of the new Afghanistan more broadly as well. To this end, a
reformed, capable Afghan National Police force - with the necessary
support from the international community and the alliance - is
imperative to ensuring the ability to protect the population. And
the new Afghan Population Protection Program announced by MOI Atmar
holds considerable promise and deserves our support as well.
On a related note, to help increase the legitimacy of the Afghan
government, we need to help our Afghan partners give the people a
reason to support the government and their local authorities. This
includes helping enable Afghan solutions to Afghan problems. And on
a related note, given the importance of Afghan solutions and
governance being viewed as legitimate by the people and in view of
allegations of corruption, such efforts likely should feature
support for what might be called an "Afghan accountability
offensive" as well. That will be an important effort.
In all that we do as we perform various missions, we need to
live our values. While our forces should not hesitate to engage and
destroy an enemy, our troopers must also stay true to the values we
hold dear. This is, after all, an important element that
distinguishes us from the enemy, and it manifests itself in many
ways, including making determined efforts to reduce to the absolute
minimum civilian casualties - an effort furthered significantly by
the tactical direction and partnering initiatives developed by GEN
McKiernan with our Afghan counterparts.
We also must strive to be first with the truth. We need to beat
the insurgents and extremists to the headlines and to pre-empt
rumors. We can do that by getting accurate information to the chain
of command, to our Afghan partners, and to the press as soon as is
possible. Integrity is critical to this fight. Thus, when
situations are bad, we should freely acknowledge that fact and
avoid temptations to spin. Rather, we should describe the setbacks
and failures we suffer and then state what we've learned from them
and how we'll adjust to reduce the chances of similar events in the
future.
Finally, we always must strive to learn and adapt. The situation
in Afghanistan has changed significantly in the past several years
and it continues to evolve. This makes it incumbent on us to assess
the situation continually and to adjust our plans, operations, and
tactics as required. We should share good ideas and best practices,
but we also should never forget that what works in an area today
may not work there tomorrow, and that what works in one area may
not work in another.
IT WILL GET HARDER BEFORE IT GETS EASIER
In conclusion, allow me to reiterate the key points I've sought
to make. We have a hugely important interest in ensuring that
Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary for
trans-national terrorists. Achieving that core objective, in turn,
requires the accomplishment of several other significant tasks.
Although there have been impressive achievements in Afghanistan
since 2001, the security situation has deteriorated markedly in
certain areas in the past two years. Reversing that trend is
necessary to improve security for the population, to permit the
conduct of free and fair elections in August, and to enable
progress in other important areas. Achieving security improvements
will require more ISAF and Afghan security forces of all types -
combat, combat support, logistics, trainers and advisors, special
operations, and so on. Some additional forces are already
deploying, further increases have been ordered or pledged, and more
are under discussion. To be effective, the additional military
forces will need to be employed in accordance with
counterinsurgency concepts applied by leaders who have a nuanced
understanding of their areas of operation. And to complement and
capitalize on the increased military resources, more civilian
assets, adequate financial resources, close civil-military
cooperation, and a comprehensive approach that encompasses regional
states will be necessary. None of this will be easy. Indeed, as
Vice President Biden observed recently, Afghanistan likely will get
harder before it gets easier. And sustained progress will require
sustained commitment. But, again, our objectives are of enormous
importance, a significant opportunity is at hand, and we all need
to summon the will and the resources necessary to make the most of
it. Thank you very much.
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